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PRECIOUS COMMODITIES: AN INTRODUCTION
Michele Goodwin*
The market in human body parts is a problem
in search of a legal theory.1
The year 2005 might well be remembered as the year of tissues,
implants, and transplants. The year was marked by revelations of
body parts being stolen from cadavers, body parts being sold by New
York funeral homes to tissue banks, the desecration of dead bodies,
body parts being stolen from victims of the powerful earthquake in
Pakistan, and the infamous face transplant from a suicide victim to a
chain smoker in France. The nation and the world were stunned by
these revelations. The events brought to light, in the most stunning
manner, the surreptitious scheming of modern-day body snatchers.
Yet it also highlighted a significant human tragedy. The current de-
mand for body parts is far greater than at any other time in human
history, and this tremendous need outstrips our ability to supply pre-
cious human tissues, organs, and other biological materials.
There exist both the public and private negotiation processes for
body part transactions. Both systems operate at crisis levels and are
characterized by incoherence and ambiguity. Our altruistic system of
procurement is sadly predictable and quite conventional; today we
know thousands will die without the hope of ever receiving an organ.
Furthermore, the waitlist will expand far beyond the capacity of organ
donors to ever meet the demand. You might consider what this all
means after a "gift of life" public service announcement airs on your
local television station. Within the span of your favorite one hour tel-
evision show, a candidate on our organ transplant waitlist will likely
die. Commentators are divided as to how this issue should be ad-
dressed. According to Peggy Radin, changing the system by introduc-
* © Associate Professor of Law; Wicklander Fellow, DePaul University College of Law.
LL.M., University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Boston College Law School. It was a pleasure
to work with Jason Greis, former symposium editor of the Law Review, to bring this symposium
to fruition. Christine Matott's leadership in the editorial process of these articles is most appre-
ciated by the authors and conference organizers. We are most indebted to the outstanding con-
tributions of colleagues who participated in this symposium as well as to Jenner & Block L.L.P.
for allowing us to use its facilities to host the meeting.
1. Professor Linda S. Greene, Remarks at round table discussion of DePaul Health Law Insti-
tute (Mar. 12, 2004).
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ing market alternatives would ultimately lead to placing values on
products from the body, thereby interfering with our notions of per-
sonhood.2 On the other hand, acquiescence to an altruistic system of
procurement would also seem to mean that we accept its failure to
generate an adequate supply of organs and the deaths that result.3
In either case, the law has yet to catch up with these new, malleable,
biotechnological regimes, which operate both within the public sphere
and also underground. The public process is best characterized by our
current organ procurement and allocation systems, which are regu-
lated at the federal level by Congress through the National Organ
Transplantation Act, and at the state level through the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act. Those systems, however, relying upon pure altruis-
tic transfers, are underserved and over-subscribed-demand for
precious body parts far outpaces altruistic supply. The private, under-
ground systems involve individuals taking their chances on buying or-
gans through the black market and companies buying and selling
human body parts and tissues from university hospitals, funeral
homes, crematoriums, and organ procurement organizations.
Authors in this Symposium edition scrutinize the law's role in de-
marking the boundaries of commodification and the human body. By
no means are their articles uniform; indeed, the diversity of opinion is
quite refreshing within the context of a critical inquiry on the supply
and demand of body parts. The scholars examine the commodifica-
tion debate within three distinct spheres: law and religion, organ mar-
kets, and tissue sales. The participants challenge the notion that
markets necessarily violate personhood, while also debating the role
of religion, socioeconomics, race, and gender in these contexts. Their
articles are perceptive, constructive commentaries about body part
supply and demand in a global economy.
Lloyd Cohen, T. Randolph Beard, and David Kaserman challenge
the presumption that a market in cadaveric body parts violates per-
sonhood, but they also seem doubtful that a market in body parts will
ever materialize.4 Cohen's arguments are provocative and almost
contrarian. He characterizes the arguments in opposition to markets
in body parts as "muddled, weak, and fatuous."' 5 Yet Cohen astutely
2. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity and Organ Commodification,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2004).
4. Lloyd R. Cohen, Directions for the Disposition of My Vital Organs, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 805
(2006); T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, On the Ethics of Paying Organ Donors: An
Economics Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 827 (2006).
5. Cohen, supra note 4, at 808.
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points out that in the more than past fifteen years of his writing on the
subject of an organ procurement system in crisis and meeting with
members of Congress on this subject, "little progress toward increas-
ing organ supplies" has been made. 6 For him and other participants in
the Symposium, the current procurement regime condemns people to
death. This year thousands will die, never coming close to receiving
the long-awaited organ. Over 90,000 patients registered on the wait-
list will vie for the relatively few viable organs that will be recovered.
Organs that are recovered will largely be credited to the fact that paid
professional solicitors stationed at hospitals are trained to implore
mourning families to donate body parts, often before the targets of
their entreaties are dead. For some commentators, this process under-
mines the very notion that organ donation is a "gifting" process even
within the altruistic context.
For example, Kaserman and Beard argue that using a cost-benefit
analysis informs us that a commodification scheme in organ procure-
ment would necessarily be better than the current altruistic system.
Their approach illuminates very sound criticisms of the current trans-
plant regime, but also reflects a thorough study of institutional effi-
ciency in organ procurement. Like Cohen, Beard and Kaserman
reject the pure altruistic regime in favor of an approach that provides
compensation to donors.
Cohen deftly argues that the only way to test the notion that an
organ market would save lives and end human suffering is, in fact, a
market test. He suggests a trial market test to study the empirical
question as to whether a market would actually increase the supply of
body organs. There is, however, one problem with his proposal, which
he acknowledges. Testing a market option in organs would be illegal
and could result in potential fines up to $50,000 and jail time. Cohen's
challenge is that opponents of the market approach "must provide
persuasive arguments why in this market, unlike virtually all others,
permitting the price to rise above zero will not increase the quantity
supplied." 7
Cohen's passionate criticisms of the current altruistic procurement
regime are controversial and sparked considerable debate at the Sym-
posium, which is carried on in these pages. For example, professors
William Stempsey and Steven Resnicoff examine the intersection of
law, bioethics, and religion in their response to whether religious
teachings give us guidance as to the buying and selling of body parts.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 811.
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Professor Resnicoff provides a Jewish perspective on the buying and
selling of body parts.8 He suggests that to answer whether Jewish law
permits the buying of body parts involves two distinct questions. First,
does Jewish law permit the transfer of body parts? Second, does Jew-
ish law permit the transferor to be paid for those body parts? He
notes that "[u]nlike common law, Jewish law imposes an affirmative
duty to save a person's life through one's direct intervention or
through the use of one's resources."9 The most sacred of Jewish laws
requires the rescue of another. Resnicoff argues that "[t]he clearest
biblical basis for this rule is the verse that states, 'Do not stand idly by
your fellow's blood."' 10 This duty to rescue is not found in secular
law; we eschew the duty to rescue. Yet within a Jewish law context,
according to Resnicoff, in order to save or rescue a person, "one must
violate every provision of Jewish law except for those relating to im-
moral sexual acts, idolatry, or murder."' 1 Where does this place the
question of the precious commodity?
According to Resnicoff, the body is revered as sacred within Jewish
religious teachings. Even the bodies of those convicted of the most
heinous crimes are to be treated as sacred. For example, "[t]he body
of a person who is executed for having committed a capital offense is
thereafter briefly hung on a tree," but his executionors are forbidden
from leaving the body in a tree overnight, "requiring instead that it be
buried on the same day as the execution. 1 2 With such respect for the
dignity of the human life, how might we reconcile the notion of an
obligation to rescue the life of one through an act that might involve
payment and the harvesting of organs? Resnicoff informs us that Jew-
ish law prohibits one from utilizing a cadaver for personal profit. Yet
a system that denies a life-saving treatment is unacceptable.
Stempsey uses what might be referred to as a strict constructionist
approach to the question of whether organs can or should be com-
modifiable objects. 13 He invokes scripture and Greek philosophy to
argue that commodification denigrates the very notion of personhood
and our humanity; even altruistic donations might reduce our bodies
to a mere collection of limbs and appendages. His formalistic reading
of biblical law and text demonstrates deference to the idea that the
8. Steven H. Resnicoff, Supplying Human Body Parts: A Jewish Law Perspective, 55 DEPAUL
L. REV. 851 (2006).
9. Id. at 853.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 856.
13. William E. Stempsey, Religion, Philosophy, and the Commodification of Human Body
Parts, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 875 (2006).
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body is to remain whole and not desecrated through the disembowel-
ment of body parts. He suggests that if the body is to be reduced to
the terms of commodification, it then follows that we have accepted
the body as property. Here is where his philosophy challenges the
thinking of some of our other conference participants.
According to Stempsey, and indeed Justice Armand Arabian, 14 the
body should not be treated as property. To whom, he questions,
would the property belong. The brain? He argues that we cannot be
simply be reduced to our psyches. Rather, "Christians conceived im-
mortality as the restoration of the wholeness of the person, but to a
person no longer enlivened only by psyche, the Aristotelian soul, but
divinized by pneuma, or spirit."'15 In sum, he puts forth the conclusion
that our brains are an insufficient means of categorizing who owns our
bodies and that within us we cannot locate the sphere of the self with-
out being of the self entirely. This existentialist view challenges the
notion that the human body and experience can be compartmental-
ized or dissected. Stempsey argues that "the person" is incomplete
without the body. It is not sufficient to suggest that what really mat-
ters is that the soul and its spirit remain intact despite the appendag-
ing of parts. To Stempsey, the human body is more than an
assemblage of parts. To reduce the body to parts and accessories is to
objectify it and conflate it with so many other objects that lack life,
spirit, meaning, and religious value.
To what extent, however, does such a position limit organ donation
altogether? It would seem that all forms of donation, when consid-
ered within the context of this approach, necessarily violate Christian
values Stempsey describes. Though an opponent to commodification
(based on prior works grounded in both utilitarian and deontological
thinking), Stempsey concedes that "there may be a reasonable way to
give moral approbation to a few forms of commodification."'1 6 His
criticisms of an organ market are grounded in a phenomenological
approach to the question of whether organ markets should be permis-
sible, meaning that we own our bodies not in the sense of owning a
computer or a car, but rather we are of our bodies. Our bodies help
us to situate ourselves in the world. The brain alone does not help us
to do this, according to the author, but rather our limbs and flesh help
us to actualize our human existence. In short, he argues, "[I]t is a
14. Justice Armand Arabian, Associate Justice, California Supreme Court (retired), Keynote
Address at the DePaul University Law Review Symposium: Precious Commodities: The Supply
& Demand of Body Parts (Mar. 4, 2005).
15. Stempsey, supra note 13, at 885.
16. Id. at 875.
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mistake to think of the body as a machine," as did philosophers such
as Descartes. 17 For Stempsey, "the body is essentially what we are,
and what enables our experience of the world. 1 8
Women might easily find flaws in Stempsey's provocative commen-
tary as it describes the body as fixed, thereby failing to account for the
rather less than static experience of the woman's body. Some might
argue that we are more than our bodies. Women's bodies release ba-
bies, milk, and blood. The regular shedding of flesh while remaining
spiritually whole would seem to conflict with Stempsey's approach to
the debate about property, commodification, and preserving religious
values. At conflict would be the notion of what is whole. Professors
Martha Ertman,19  June Carbone,20  and othcrs within the
socioeconomics school might suggest that women are more than what
their bodies produce or that they cannot be reduced to the immutable
function of body parts. 21
Yet, it is exactly the immutability of body parts and the lack of ac-
cess to them that round out the discussion in this Symposium.
Michelle Oberman, David Undis, Robert Katz, and Raymond Pollack
demonstrate in their eloquent prose that whatever procurement
scheme we design will be met by controversy and skepticism. Indeed,
the tragic couplings of a censured, unlicensed dentist from New Jersey
and New York City funeral homes should give us pause about creative
schemes to procure body parts.
David Undis, the president of LifeSharers, the organization leading
the way in a provocative "directed donation" model, argues that the
entire paradigm of organ allocation must shift. According to Undis,
"If we change how we allocate organs we will have more organs to
allocate. ' 22 Critics suggest that directed donation models violate utili-
tarian principles and promote injustice in the organ allocation process.
Indeed, one might envision elements of affirmative action and quota
systems in such a model; organs reserved exclusively for one group at
the exclusion of others. Yet, for Undis, the case is simple: "Agreeing
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong With a Parenthood Market? A New and Im-
proved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2003); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a
Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).
20. June Carbone, What Do Women Really Want? Feminism, Justice and the Market for Inti-
mate Relationships, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW & SOCIETY
405 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
21. Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and The Double Bind: The Choice of
Motherhood, 9 IOWA J. JUST. RACE & GENDER 1 (2005).
22. See David J. Undis, Changing Organ Allocation Will Increase Organ Supply, 55 DEPAUL
L. REV. 889, 889 (2006).
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to donate your organs after you die is a small price to pay for a better
chance to get an organ if you ever need one to live."' 23 Undis suggests
that "[a]lmost everyone would decide to pay that price, ' 24 thereby in-
creasing the supply of organs and saving the lives of thousands each
year.
Undis ultimately urges a behavior change; he wants Americans to
buy into the system of donating. But he concedes by the very work
that he is doing and the article that illuminates it that the current or-
gan procurement system itself is lacking. Faith, confidence, and trust
are not values commonly associated with the current organ procure-
ment system, particularly for those individuals and their families who
suffer through protracted illnesses treatable by transplants that will
never materialize because of the severe organ shortage. LifeSharers,
however, opens the door for alternative schemes to be pursued, a few
of which may be more controversial than others. For example, given
the dramatic shortage of organs suitable for transplantation in African
Americans (according to UNOS), what if African Americans were to
create their own organ procurement scheme that served their commu-
nities? This could be organized through churches and fraternal orga-
nizations. The organization would be very similar to LifeSharers, and
certainly the motivating principles would be the same-to save the
lives of persons in need of organ transplantation. It is likely that such
a system would be challenged based on the fact that it excludes all
non-African Americans. Of course there are clever ways to avoid
such problems. For example, if a directed donation program hap-
pened to be organized by churches that so happen to serve majority
African American populations, it would arguably not be a system
based on exclusion, but the demographics of location.
Dr. Raymond Pollack, however, seems unpersuaded by directed do-
nation systems such as LifeSharers. He suggests that there is enor-
mous potential for chaos with such systems and policing fairness and
equity is difficult.25 Moreover, he finds that the more immediate solu-
tions to our procurement problems rest with the dead. For him, ca-
daveric donations provide the best source for organ donations, and it
is within this context that potential solutions must be explored. He
suggests that more advertising campaigns and public awareness ad-
dresses will encourage greater donations. His optimism, however, is
unmatched by the current realities of organ procurement. Donna
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Raymond Pollak, Cadaver Donors Are the Best Solution to the Organ Shortage, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 897 (2006).
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Shalala, former Secretary of Health and Human Services,
spearheaded public service campaigns to directly address the organ
procurement crises, particularly in underserved communities. Yet,
what we have begrudgingly come to learn is that Americans are not as
altruistic when it comes to surrendering their organs as we might have
liked to believe. In part, the reluctance among some to donate has
much to do with the lack of confidence in the current procurement
process. In this way, if education campaigns were aimed at explaining
why so many people die while waiting for organs (beyond the simple
supply and demand equations), perhaps the public might be more will-
ing to surrender their organs. But many are unconvinced, and it is
because of the sometimes clandestine practices associated with body
part procurement that millions refuse to be organ donors.
Professors Michelle Oberman and Robert Katz provide two
nuanced views of the market in tissues, an industry that exists in the
shadows of organ transplantation. Unlike the organ procurement re-
gime, there exists a robust tissue industry that operates in public view
of law enforcement, but for reasons of unknown, happen to be largely
overlooked. That the tissue banking industry publicly circumvents
federal and state laws by purchasing body parts from hospitals, univer-
sities, and even organ procurement organizations and resells the tis-
sues to hospitals and doctors seemingly goes unnoticed. In this
private domain of tissue banking, hundreds of millions of dollars are
generated each year. Profits are expected to top one billion dollars in
this fiscal year.26 Many of these companies trade on the global stock
exchanges, demonstrating all the more that altruism is not a part of
their business plan.
In her illuminating article, When the Truth Is Not Enough: Tissue
Donation, Altruism, and the Market, Professor Michelle Oberman ex-
amines the reach and limits of the marketplace in body parts, espe-
cially tissues. 27 Noting that more than 800,000 allograft surgeries
involving tissues occur each year, she explores the contours of how
this robust industry affects our lives and whether we should be troub-
led by the industry's failure to compensate the unwitting donor.
Oberman pierces the opaque veil around tissue bank retrieval of
human body parts and how the tissues ultimately come to be used.
Tissue banks do not directly solicit individuals to procure body parts.
Rather, they work through middlemen who negotiate for body parts
that were altruistically donated to hospitals and other organizations.
26. Michelle Oberman, When the Truth Is Not Enough: Tissue Donation, Altruism, and the
Market, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 903, 911 (2006).
27. Id.
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Unsuspecting donors believe their body parts will be used exclu-
sively for altruistic purposes (such as implantation into another per-
son) or for scientific research seeking to cure diseases. Yet, Oberman
notes, "There are myriad uses for tissue retrieved from human cadav-
ers. Skin grafts can be used to treat burns or can be processed into
products that are useful for cosmetic purposes such as enhancing lip
size, reducing wrinkles, or enlarging penises. ' 28 The features of the
tissue banking industry are far from ideal; they involve uninformed
participants who donate at the most vulnerable stages of their lives
(after the death of a loved one)-a generous act that enables a market
transaction. Though individuals cannot be compensated for donating
tissue, every other aspect of the industry involves financial compensa-
tion and market competition. To pretend that this does not exist is to
fall prey to our own veil of willing ignorance and, in such cases, igno-
rance is not bliss. Oberman contends that recent efforts by the federal
government to eliminate solicitor fraud (i.e., requiring disclosure that
an organ, body, or body part might be transferred to a "tissue proces-
sor") is an inadequate response. Through her lens, the truth is not
enough; our goal should be to balance legal tissue donations, because
they are important, while not creating aversions to the donation pro-
cess altogether.
Katz builds on this point in his article, The Re-Gift of Life: Can
Charity Law Prevent For-Profit Firms From Exploiting Donated Tis-
sue and Nonprofit Tissue Banks?29 Katz is less optimistic as to
whether we, as a society, are "ready" to allow individuals to capture
the profit in their tissues. Katz argues for the veil that separates us as
members of a society to be lifted from the gruesome task of pricing
tissues. For this reason, though willing to scrutinize and criticize the
current tissue procurement regime, Katz's ultimate conclusion is that
the system is not so bad. For example, he argues that there are some
advantages to the current arrangement that must be considered before
making any changes. According to Katz, by encouraging tissue
processors to capture the economic value of donated tissue, they have
"more incentive and resources to develop" new therapeutic uses for
donated tissue.30 Thus, while Oberman argues for greater trans-
parency, Katz reminds us of what he considers the benefits of "con-
cealing" market exchanges from public view. Katz does concede,
28. Id. at 910.
29. Robert A. Katz, The Re-Gift of Life: Can Charity Law Prevent For-Profit Firms From
Exploiting Donated Tissue and Nonprofit Tissue Banks?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (2006).
30. Id. at 1014.
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however, that a conscious policy of concealing commodification from
donors may itself raise ethical problems.
Our final papers of the Symposium, written by Professors Elisa
Gordon and Kieren Healy, remind us that at the center of these dis-
courses should be the discussion of equity, access, and the furtherance
of antidiscrimination in the retrieval and disposition of organs and tis-
sues. In his article, Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procure-
ment Rates?, Professor Healy examines whether presumed-consent
laws might offer a solution to our procurement challenges. 31 Pre-
sumed-consent laws are conscription measures that assume consent in
place of an expressed agreement with the state. 32 Healy extrapolates
from the European models, specifically those of Spain and Italy, that a
more efficient way to generate an adequate organ supply might be to
require an opt out rather than an opt in system. Such models, em-
blematic of the social contract concept, and grounded philosophically
in the works of Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls, place the onus of pro-
curement upon the state and are assumed at the individual level.
These utilitarian concepts take into account some problems that are
not individual in nature, but rather are "community concerns" and the
best mode of addressing such problems, according to this theory, is
that we as a community sacrifice to make such goals, whatever they
may be, come to fruition.
Anita Allen is among the more critical observers of social contract
theory.33 According to Allen, the social contract can be used accord-
ing to a majoritarian purpose, exacting greater costs on the vulnerable
than the elite. The benefits of the derivatives will often inure to those
who sacrifice the least. Healy uses empirical data to develop his thesis
that compelled donation increases the supply of organs and yet pre-
serves next-of-kin autonomy. To support his thesis, he argues that
"[piresumed-consent countries do in fact perform a little better on av-
erage than informed-consent countries. ' 34 Healy attributes this "suc-
cess" not to any "direct effect of the law on individual choices," but
rather, "countries with presumed-consent laws are more likely to have
paid close attention to the social organization of their transplant sys-
tems." To Healy, the Spanish and Italian systems are successful be-
cause the framers were mindful of the economic and social pitfalls of
31. Kieran Healy, Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1017 (2006).
32. Id.; see also Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking,
Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2001).
33. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (1999).
34. Healy, supra note 31, at 1042.
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the social contract model, and had effectively developed the "logis-
tics" of the transplant system, including paying attention to staffing.
The debate about whether a presumed consent system would be via-
ble in the United States raises a different set of questions, however,
that are most appropriately considered in the context of race and
class.35 The unique history of extended human bondage in the United
States, which was exclusively race-based, provides a context in con-
trast to that of European nations-that might well and did engage in
race-based slavery outside of their hemisphere, and bondage, which
included whites in their own states. These unique differences largely
contribute to the ways in which racial identities are realized and
manipulated for purposes of discrimination and exploitation.
Indeed, examining organ procurement and allocation through the
lenses tinted by race or muddied by poverty renders an entirely differ-
ent discussion and policy outcomes. The uncomfortable realities of
race discrimination and class subordination in the United States re-
mind us that organ transplantation does not escape the legacy of dis-
crimination or disparities. Professor Gordon thus asks, What are we
missing in the transplantation market debate? 36 Her proposals are
not radical, and probably speak the least to the question of body part
commodification. Her paper instead offers a proposal for government
subsidized insurance, which provides the only access for the poor to
benefit from high-tech medical options such as organ transplants.
Perhaps for Gordon the question of markets is a luxury debate. She
reminds us that the nation's poorest are the most vulnerable. They
lack truly viable access to organ transplantation. Current healthcare
policies limit the level of economic support for postoperative treat-
ments. Government subsidies do not follow the life of an organ, but
rather provide an equal opportunity to receive one-but not necessa-
rily to keep it. Gordon's paper is provocative: she asks what are the
limits of biotechnology and healthcare. When and where can we draw
the lines? Ultimately, limited government support for postoperative
transplant care affects patient and physician decisionmaking. If a pa-
tient cannot afford immunological treatments to prevent rejection, is
he or she truly a viable candidate? Thus, when we discuss markets
and costs of transplantation, doing so without earnest sensitivity to
class and creativity as to how the poor will be equitable participants is
less than ideal. Indeed, it is unacceptable. Public policy, according to
35. See, e.g., MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY
PARTS (2006).
36. Elisa J. Gordon, The Ethics of Medicare Policy: Increasing Transplant Access and Survival,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1045 (2006).
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Gordon, must "shift in concert with the needs of the kidney recipient
population .... ,,37 Expanding coverage to subsidize the life of the
kidney, according to Gordon, is the equitable way to proceed.
In the end, we are confronted with the law's limits to give us what
we want. Current public policy, as it relates to organ procurement,
leaves a broad spectrum of scholars desirous of a more equitable, just,
and efficient system. Their efforts to parse out how such systems can
be developed and what they might look like are published in this spe-
cial Symposium edition. I am grateful for their efforts and honesty.
37. Id. at 1065.
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